1;Supply ChainCoordination Mechanisms;2 1.1;1 Introduction;20 1.1.1;1.1 Motivation and Goals of This Work;20 1.1.2;1.2 Methodology;21 1.1.3;1.3 Outline;21 1.2;2 Supply Chain Planning and Coordination;23 1.2.1;2.1 Supply Chain Planning;23 1.2.1.1;2.1.1 Definitions and Overview;23 1.2.1.2;2.1.2 Master Planning;26 1.2.2;2.2 Model Formulations for Master Planning;27 1.2.2.1;2.2.1 Generic Master Planning Model;28 1.2.2.2;2.2.2 Extension to Lot-Sizing;30 1.2.2.2.1;2.2.2.1 Basic Models;30 1.2.2.2.2;2.2.2.2 Extension to Campaign Planning;32 1.2.3;2.3 Decentralized Planning and Coordination;38 1.2.3.1;2.3.1 Basic Definitions;38 1.2.3.2;2.3.2 Decentralized Supply Chain Planning;42 1.2.3.2.1;2.3.2.1 Models for Decentralized Planning;42 1.2.3.2.2;2.3.2.2 Drivers for Suboptimality of Decentralized Planning;44 1.2.3.3;2.3.3 Upstream Vs. Collaborative Planning;48 1.3;3 Coordination Mechanisms for Supply Chain Planning;53 1.3.1;3.1 Symmetric Information;53 1.3.1.1;3.1.1 Non-cooperative Game Theory;54 1.3.1.1.1;3.1.1.1 Coordination on Quantities and Time;55 1.3.1.1.2;3.1.1.2 Coordination of Lot Cycles;58 1.3.1.2;3.1.2 Cooperative Game Theory;59 1.3.2;3.2 One-Sided Information Asymmetry;61 1.3.2.1;3.2.1 Signaling;61 1.3.2.2;3.2.2 Screening;63 1.3.3;3.3 Multilateral Information Asymmetry;66 1.3.3.1;3.3.1 Auctions and Their Application to Supply Chain Coordination;66 1.3.3.2;3.3.2 Mechanisms with Focus on Proposal Generation;69 1.3.3.2.1;3.3.2.1 Outline of Dual Decomposition;70 1.3.3.2.2;3.3.2.2 Literature;73 1.3.3.2.3;3.3.2.3 Discussion and Conclusions;78 1.4;4 New Coordination Schemes;80 1.4.1;4.1 Generic Scheme for Linear Programming and Analytical Results;81 1.4.1.1;4.1.1 Version with Iterative, Unilateral Exchange of Cost Information;81 1.4.1.2;4.1.2 Version with One-Shot Exchange of Cost Information;97 1.4.2;4.2 Scheme for Uncapacitated Dynamic Lot-Sizing and Analytical Results;99 1.4.3;4.3 Application to Master Planning;116 1.4.3.1;4.3.1 Linearization;116 1.4.3.2;4.3.2 Adaptation to Master Planning;120 1.4.3.3;4.3.3 Generic Modifications;128 1.4.3.4;4.3.4 Modifications for Master Planning;131 1.4.4;4.4 Customizations;137 1.4.4.1;4.4.1 Master Planning with Lot-Sizing;137 1.4.4.2;4.4.2 Voluntary Compliance;139 1.4.4.3;4.4.3 Lost Sales;140 1.4.4.4;4.4.4 Multiple Suppliers;143 1.5;5 New Coordination Mechanisms;145 1.5.1;5.1 Surplus Sharing Determined by the Informed Party;146 1.5.2;5.2 Surplus Sharing Determined by Lump-Sum Payments;149 1.5.3;5.3 Surplus Sharing by a Double Auction;157 1.5.4;5.4 Comparison of Mechanisms and Discussion;165 1.5.5;5.5 Application with Rolling Schedules;167 1.6;6 Computational Tests of Coordination Schemes;171 1.6.1;6.1 General Master Planning Model;171 1.6.1.1;6.1.1 Generation of Test Instances and Performance Indicators;171 1.6.1.2;6.1.2 Analysis of Solutions for the Generic Scheme;178 1.6.1.3;6.1.3 Analysis of Solutions for the Modified Scheme;180 1.6.2;6.2 Uncapacitated Lot-Sizing Problem;185 1.6.2.1;6.2.1 Generation of Test Instances;185 1.6.2.2;6.2.2 Analysis of Solutions;187 1.6.3;6.3 Multi-level Capacitated Lot-Sizing Problem;190 1.6.4;6.4 Models for Campaign Planning;195 1.6.4.1;6.4.1 Generation of Test Instances;195 1.6.4.2;6.4.2 Analysis of Solutions;196 1.6.5;6.5 Real-World Supply Chain Planning Problems;200 1.6.5.1;6.5.1 Planning Problems and Model Formulation;201 1.6.5.2;6.5.2 Analysis of Solutions;208 1.7;7 Summary and Outlook;213 1.8;References;216